We examine the effect of financial advisor reputation on wealth gains in corporate takeovers. In view of the adversarial nature of a takeover, we construct a measure of the relative reputation of the advisor. We document that the absolute wealth gain as well as the share of the total takeover wealth gain accruing to the bidder (target) increases (decreases) as the reputation of the bidder's advisor increases relative to that of the target. We also find that the total wealth created in the takeover is positively related to the reputation of bidder and target advisors. While bidder advisor reputation is positively related to the probability of bid success in our sample, we also present some evidence to suggest that bidders with better advisors are more likely to withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers.
I. Introduction
Does employing a prestigious financial advisor affect the creation and/or the sharing of wealth gains in a corporate takeover? Recent evidence in finance research suggests that it does not. For instance, Servaes and Zenner (1996) find no relation between advisor reputation and bidder wealth. Rau (2000) concludes that advisor reputation has a positive influence on the likelihood of completing the deal and on the advisor's market share, but not on the client firm's stock price. 1 The inability of researchers to document a relation between advisor reputation and wealth effects in takeover contests is surprising since the investment banking industry is extremely hierarchical in nature and a few prestigious investment bankers continue to dominate advisory services to firms involved in takeover contests. In this paper, we conduct a detailed investigation of financial advisor involvement in corporate takeovers that occur through tender offers during the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] . We document that when the client firm (bidder or target) employs a more reputable financial advisor, it enjoys a greater absolute wealth gain as well as a larger share of the total wealth created in a successful takeover.
To our knowledge, there is no clear definition of financial advisor reputation in the context of a takeover. However, models of reputation building in product markets and in capital raising provide useful insights for analyzing reputation building by the financial advisors to firms engaged in takeovers. In product markets, the firm sells its product to customers repeatedly and develops "a good reputation if consumers believe its products to be of high quality" (Shapiro (1983) , p. 659). Theorists modeling product markets argue that the desire to build a good reputation provides a firm that offers high quality goods with the incentive to continue providing these high quality products (Klein and Leffler (1981) , Shapiro (1983) , and Allen (1984) ). The incentive to build a reputation arises because firms can sell higher quality goods at prices above the average cost of production and therefore generate greater future cash flows.
In capital raising, issuing firms have private information regarding the value of the security that they plan to issue and financial intermediaries act as information producers or middlemen whose function is to certify the value of the security (Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Booth and Smith (1986) , Titman and Trueman (1986) , and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) ). In this setting, financial intermediaries and not issuing firms come to the market repeatedly; they occasionally make mistakes since they are less informed than issuing firms; and they have differing abilities in generating accurate valuation information. Since intermediaries must come to the market repeatedly, they have the incentive to build reputation as providers of more accurate valuation information or, equivalently, as more credible certifiers.
We propose that the concept of advisor reputation in takeovers encompasses aspects of reputation building by producers in the product markets and by financial intermediaries involved in security issuance. Financial advisors perform two distinct roles in takeovers (McLaughlin (1990 (McLaughlin ( ), (1992 ). First, they help in identifying and/or structuring better mergers, that is, mergers with higher expected synergistic gains. In this role, advisors identify potential targets (bidders), evaluate stand-alone and combined values, and propose methods for obtaining synergies. Although these activities produce information that makes hidden value more transparent, they go beyond certification and provide services that create value. Second, financial advisors provide firms engaged in a takeover contest with advice on strategic activities. Strategic activities benefit the advisor's client at the opponent's cost, or, as Brealey and Myers (2000) , p. 951, note, "(T)heir gain is your cost." Strategic activities on the part of the bidder advisor include designing offers to ensure takeover success at the lowest possible offer price. The advisor to the target attempts to increase the takeover premium through strategic actions ranging from deploying takeover defenses to locating alternative suitors. The adversarial nature of takeover contests in which both sides, the bidder and the target, can employ advisors adds another level of complexity to the analysis.
Financial advisors in takeovers have the incentive to build a good reputation because, as in reputation-building models for product markets, they need to sell their products in the market repeatedly, either to the same customer or to others. The products of financial advisors in takeovers include the ability to detect better bidders or targets, the ability to structure the deal such that synergy gains are greater for a given bidder-target pair, and the ability to provide strategic advice that increases their client's share of the total wealth gain from the takeover. When an advisor performs these functions well, the client's wealth increases and the advisor improves its reputation. As a result, the financial advisor increases its market share by attracting more and bigger clients in the future and collects larger fees.
2 Since all activities by advisors affect the wealth of their clients, the quality of their services can be inferred from the effects on the stock prices of their client firms. It follows that employing a higher reputation advisor should result in superior wealth gains for the client firm. 3 Based on the preceding discussion, we offer the following hypotheses. The better merger hypothesis contends that high reputation advisors will identify more valuable mergers and/or structure the deal to achieve higher total synergies. However, the adversarial nature of the takeover contest makes it difficult to test this hypothesis by analyzing the relation between the client firm's wealth gain and the reputation of its financial advisor. A firm's wealth gain from a takeover depends on the synergies that are created and also on the proportion of those synergies the firm receives. The strategic activities of financial advisors affect the proportional sharing of the total wealth gains. Therefore, to examine the ability of higher reputation advisors to identify better mergers one must use wealth gain measures that are not affected by the strategic actions of financial advisors. We use the combined wealth gain to the target and the bidder for this purpose. The hypothesized positive relation between advisor reputation and takeover wealth gains can be unambiguously validated only for combined wealth gains. The better merger hypothesis predicts that the combined wealth gain should be positively related to the reputation of both the bidder and the target advisor.
The strategic bargaining hypothesis posits that a client that employs a higher reputation advisor will receive a larger share of the total synergistic gains from the takeover. However, whether the client has a strategic advantage depends on the reputation of its advisor relative to the reputation of the advisor to the opposing side and not on the absolute reputation of the advisor. For example, neither the target nor the bidder likely gains a strategic advantage if both firms choose high reputation advisors. On the other hand, a bidder that employs a medium reputation advisor likely gains a strategic advantage over a target that uses a low reputation advisor. Therefore, any empirical analysis that examines the relation between the reputation of the bidder's (target's) advisor and the wealth gains to the bidder (target) must utilize a relative reputation proxy that measures how the reputation of one advisor compares to that of the other party. The strategic bargaining hypothesis predicts that a bidder's (target's) wealth gains and its share of the combined wealth gains will be positively (negatively) related to the relative reputation of the bidder's advisor. The failure to recognize the strategic role of financial advisors in takeovers potentially explains why earlier researchers were unable to document a relation between advisor reputation and client wealth gain.
We analyze 324 successful takeovers and find significant relations between advisor reputation and takeover wealth gains that support both the better merger and the strategic bargaining hypotheses. An advisor's share of the mergers and acquisition market serves as our measure of reputation, and the ratio of the bidder advisor's reputation to that of the target advisor serves as our measure of the relative reputation. We document that the wealth gain to the bidder is greater when its advisor's reputation relative to the target advisor is higher. The wealth gain to the target is negatively related to the relative reputation of the bidder's advisor. The total wealth created in the takeover (sum of bidder and target wealth gains) is positively related to the reputation levels of both bidder and target advisors, and the share of the combined wealth gains accruing to the bidder is positively related to the relative reputation of the bidder's advisor. These findings indicate that retaining a more prestigious advisor leads to more wealth creation through better mergers and increases client firm wealth by providing strategic bargaining advantages. These results, however, raise some important issues, namely, why would low quality advisors exist and why would the target ever choose an advisor with a reputation lower than that of the bidder advisor. Later in the article, in the spirit of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , we describe a reputation-building process that addresses both these issues.
We next investigate why bidders and targets retain financial advisors. As in Servaes and Zenner (1996) , we find that the bidder is more likely to use a financial advisor when the bid is hostile, the deal value is large, and the bidder has less acquisition experience. To our knowledge, the target's decision to retain an advisor has not been previously explored. We find that the likelihood that the target will retain a financial advisor is positively related to the strategic complexity of the contest (e.g., the use of a poison pill or litigation) and to the size of both the target and the bidder. These findings on hostility (bidder) and strategic complexity (target) suggest that firms retain financial advisors not only to minimize the transactions costs associated with larger deals but also to obtain strategic advice. McLaughlin (1990 McLaughlin ( ), (1992 notes that contractual features provide advisors with the financial incentives to complete deals but argues that reputation-building concerns will mitigate the incentive to complete the deal at all costs and protect the interests of the client firms. 4 Our earlier findings suggest that more reputed advisors find better mergers. Since better mergers are more likely to be completed, our results imply a positive relation between advisor reputation and the likelihood of deal completion. Rau (2000) , p. 297, however, finds a positive relation between bidder advisor reputation and the probability of deal completion "irrespective of whether the deal actually adds value to the acquirer." Our inves- 4 The contractual features that engender incentives to complete the deal may be different for target and bidder advisors. McLaughlin (1990) documents that a large portion of bidder advisor contractual payments is contingent on the number of shares purchased whereas payments to target advisors are contingent on the price received. These differences, together with the observation that fixed fees are greater for target advisors, should reduce the target advisor's incentive to complete the deal at any cost.
tigation confirms the results in Rau (2000) that using a higher reputation advisor increases the probability that a bidder is successful.
To investigate whether deal completion is the sole objective of advisors, we examine a sample of successful multiple bidder contests. We find that the higher the reputation of the bidder's advisor, the greater the probability that the bidder withdraws from (completes) a takeover that ultimately results in a wealth loss (gain) to the successful bidder. Furthermore, we find that the probability that both the successful and the unsuccessful bidders generate positive wealth gains is positively related to the reputation of their advisors. These results appear to support the assertion in McLaughlin (1990 McLaughlin ( ), (1992 that the client's welfare will be protected by the advisor's reputation concerns despite contractual features that provide incentives to advisors to complete deals.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. We describe the data and the variables used in the analysis in Section II. In Section III, we present our results on the relation between takeover wealth gains and financial advisor reputation together with a discussion of possible endogeneity issues arising from the decision to retain an advisor and a characterization of the process by which advisors in takeovers acquire reputation over time. We describe the results from our analysis of whether advisor reputation affects bidder success and bidder wealth gains by successful and unsuccessful bidders in successful (multiple bidder) contests in Section IV, and offer our concluding remarks in Section V.
II. Data Sources, Variable Construction, and Measurement of Wealth Gains
A. Data Sources
From the Worldwide M&A Section of the Securities Data Company (SDC) database, we obtain information on i) the identities of the firms involved in the tender offers, ii) the names of the financial advisors involved in the transaction, iii) the functions performed by the financial advisors, iv) the announcement dates for the bids and the resolution dates of the takeover contests, v) the bid prices and the prices paid for target shares, vi) the existence of anti-takeover measures, vii) the medium of exchange, viii) the initial reaction (hostile or otherwise) of the target management, ix) the existence of any pending litigation related to the takeover, x) any clearance required from regulatory agencies, xi) whether the state in which the target is incorporated has any anti-takeover laws, xii) whether any family owns more than 20% of the target's equity, xiii) all four-digit SIC codes for the target and the bidder, xiv) the outcome of the tender offer, xv) the takeoverrelated market shares of the financial advisors, and xvi) post-takeover spin-offs and divestitures. We obtain the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target and the bidder in the 10-year period prior to the current takeover from Moody's Manuals, or from the SDC when the data are unavailable from Moody's. Insider ownership data are from the Valueline Investment Surveys, or, when unavailable from Valueline, from company proxy statements. We confirm the identity of the deal advisors from media sources including The Investment Dealers Digest, Mergers and Acquisitions, and Lexis/Nexis.
To be included in our sample, a contest must meet the following criteria: i) both the bidder and the target have stock returns from 300 days prior to the announcement of the first bid for the target through five days after the announcement of the successful bid on the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) tapes, ii) the transaction is not a self-tender offer, iii) the bidder owns less than 50% of the target's equity prior to the offer, and iv) the bidder seeks to purchase at least 15% of the target's shares. The start of a contest is the date of the first announcement of a bid for the target provided there has not been a bid for the target in the year before that date. We verify the information relating to announcement dates and deal characteristics for each contest in our sample from the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service.
We identify 390 takeover contests from 1981-1994 that satisfy the above selection criteria. We classify a takeover as successful if the bidder acquires at least 15% of the outstanding shares of the target, which results in 352 successful and 38 unsuccessful contests. Complete data are available for both the successful bidder and the target in 324 of the 352 successful contests. Thus, we conduct our analysis of successful takeovers on samples of 324 bidders and 324 targets. For the 390 contests, we have data for 413 bidder firms of which 324 are successful bidders and 89 are unsuccessful. Of the 89 unsuccessful bidders, 38 are bidders in takeover attempts that are not completed and 51 are unsuccessful bidders in completed multiple bidder takeovers. We have data for successful bidders in only 23 of the 51 completed multiple bidder contests.
In our sample of 413 tender offer bids, we have a total of 78 financial advisors representing either targets or bidders. Targets (bidders) employ 60 (49) advisors with 29 (18) target (bidder) advisors never representing bidders (targets). Both the target and the bidder employ advisors in 316 of the 413 tender offer bids, while both the target and the successful bidder employ financial advisors in 246 of the sample of 324 successful contests.
B. Measurement of Wealth Gains
Our analysis requires us to construct measures of both absolute and proportional wealth gains. We cannot use cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) because it is not possible to construct a meaningful measure of the proportional wealth gain using percentage returns. Furthermore, since acquiring firms are generally much larger than target firms, the same dollar wealth gain results in a disproportionately large CAR for the average target firm when compared to the average bidder's CAR. 5 We compute dollar-denominated wealth gains as in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and adjust for the bidder's toehold ownership. The combined abnormal wealth gain from a successful takeover (CWLTH) is defined as the sum of the abnormal wealth gain to the target (TWLTH) and the bidder (BWLTH).
We first estimate the firm's daily abnormal stock returns based on market model parameter estimates for the firm's return-generating process computed for 240 days, beginning 300 days before the announcement of the first tender offer in the contest. We calculate the target's cumulative abnormal return, TCAR, by summing these daily abnormal returns from five trading days before the date of the first bid and through the close of the fifth trading day after the announcement of the successful bid. The bidder's cumulative abnormal return, BCAR, is calculated by summing the daily abnormal returns from five trading days before the date of the first announcement by that bidder and through the close of the fifth trading day after the announcement of the successful bid. We estimate the dollar gain to the target and the bidder as
TMV i´B MV i µ is the market value of the outstanding shares of the target (bidder) six days before the announcement of the first bid, and Bidder Toehold is the bidder's toehold fraction. 6 We also compute a variable (BPROP) that measures the bidder's share of the combined abnormal wealth gain from the takeover. When the combined wealth created (CWLTH) is positive, we define BPROP as BWLTH/CWLTH. When CWLTH is negative, we define BPROP as 1 ´BWLTH CWLTHµ . The target's share of the wealth gain is´1 BPROPµ and the predictions are opposite to those for the bidder's share. Although our measure BPROP provides intuitive rankings for a large set of possibilities, we acknowledge that ranking with any measure of proportional wealth gain is sometimes difficult to rationalize when CWLTH is negative. 7 We conduct our tests on the relation between financial advisor reputation and takeover wealth gains on the sample of 324 successful takeovers. In our robustness analysis and other tests, we utilize other subsamples of the 390 takeovers. We present cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and takeover wealth gains only for the sample of 324 successful takeovers in Table 1 for ease of exposition and because the values are fairly representative of the larger sample. The mean (median) CARs to the target, bidder, and combined portfolio are 34.24% (31.26%), 0.40% (0.14%), and 6.42% (4.45%), respectively. 8 The average abnormal wealth gain to target shareholders is $153.892 million and that to bidder shareholders is $17.485 million. The median values for these variables are $27.682 million for target shareholders and $0.060 million for bidder shareholders. The mean (median) combined wealth gain is $136.406 million ($27.410 million). The 6 We obtain similar results when we repeat our tests without adjusting TWLTH for the bidder's toehold ownership. We also find similar results when we use market-adjusted returns or a market model with a zero intercept term to control for the bias in estimating the bidder's expected return (see Schwert (1996) , (2000)).
7 To abstract away from the difficulties associated with near zero and negative values of CWLTH, we define BWDIFF BWLTH TWLTH as a measure of the bidder's relative gain. Ranked BWD-IFF potentially suffers from a size bias. Nevertheless, our findings for BWDIFF with respect to advisor reputation are similar to those for BPROP. For purposes of brevity, we do not report these results.
8 See Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983 ), (1988 ), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988 , and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) for similar findings. For instance, the comparable mean CARs in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) are 31.77%, 0.97%, and 7.43%. The minimum CAR for targets, 63.02%, results from the takeover of MECA by H&R Block. In this case, the target firm is a volatile software company (beta 3.1) facing cash constraints. Prior to the offer by H&R Block, the U.S. Justice Department blocked a premium offer by ChipSoft due to antitrust concerns. We estimate our tests without this observation and obtain similar results to those reported in the tables. mean (median) BPROP is 0.711 (0.034) and the minimum and maximum values are 42.262 and 6.729. The high degree of dispersion of TWLTH, BWLTH, CWLTH, and BPROP suggests that it is important to consider the influence of extreme values when designing our tests. The sample consists of 324 successful tender offers from 1981-1994. TCAR, BCAR, and CCAR represent the target abnormal returns, bidder abnormal returns, and combined abnormal returns to the target and the bidder, respectively. TWLTH and BWLTH denote the abnormal wealth effects to the target and the bidder, respectively, and CWLTH BWLTH + TWLTH. BPROP is a measure of proportional wealth gain to the bidder and is computed as BWLTH/ CWLTH if CWLTH is positive and equals 1 (BWLTH/CWLTH) if CWLTH is negative.
Finally, target and bidder wealth gains are positive in 95.4% and 50.6% of the transactions, respectively. The combined wealth gains are positive in 74.4% of the transactions, indicating that most of the takeovers create value. The abnormal wealth gain to the bidder is greater than that to the target in 26.9% of the transactions. The conventional belief in the literature is that most of the takeover gains accrue to targets.
9 Consistent with the earlier findings, the average abnormal (dollar) wealth gain to the bidder in our sample of takeovers is indeed negligible. The fact that bidder wealth gain is greater than that of the target in 26.9% of the takeovers, however, suggests that the division of takeover gains between bidder and target firms deserves further scrutiny.
C. Financial Advisor Reputation
Researchers have proposed several different measures for reputation. Megginson and Weiss (1991) use market share while Bowers and Miller (1990) and Servaes and Zenner (1996) divide advisors into a top tier, comprised of the top five investment banks, and a second tier, comprised of all other advisors. Rau (2000) uses three reputation tiers based on market share. Alternatively, Carter and Manaster (1990) compute a proxy based on the investment bank's position in tombstone advertisements for IPOs. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) show that continuous market share, three-tier market share rankings, and tombstone rankings are highly correlated for the IPO market.
We measure the reputation of the target advisor (TREP) and the bidder advisor (BREP) by their respective market shares in the year of the takeover. We first determine the total dollar volume of all corporate takeovers in the SDC database and then compute each advisor's share of this amount for each sample year from 1981-1994. The bidder and target advisors in each transaction are given credit for the full value of the deal. If the target (bidder) uses more than one advisor, we assign TREP (BREP) the highest market share of the multiple advisors. 10 We measure the relative reputation of the bidder's advisor (RELREP) as the ratio of BREP to TREP.
We present the descriptive statistics for advisor reputation for our sample of 324 successful takeovers in panel A of Table 2 . We substitute the mean value for advisor reputation when the bidder/target does not employ an advisor. Since Servaes and Zenner (1996) contend that in many instances firms do not hire an advisor because they possess in-house expertise, assigning a zero to BREP or TREP when there is no advisor would be incorrect. Therefore, we assign the average value for BREP (TREP) when a bidder (target) does not have an advisor. These averages are computed over 301 target firms and 254 bidder firms, respectively.
The mean (median) for the target advisors is 6.591% (6.367%). For the bidder advisors, both the mean and median are 6.560%. To put these reputation values in perspective, in each of the 14 sample years, the average advisor in our sample would be ranked (by market share) in the top 10. If we use the coarser bulge/non-bulge classification for advisor reputation, the average/median advisor in our sample would usually fall in the bulge category. Substituting the average values for BREP and TREP when the firm does not employ an advisor creates the maximum value for RELREP, 4,099.875, and results in a mean (75.694) that is much greater than the median (0.987). Given that the mean/median values for target and bidder advisors are similar, the median value for RELREP better represents the central tendency. To ensure that the average values for BREP and TREP do not drive our results, we also estimate regressions on ranked wealth gains for the sample of 246 deals in which both the target and the bidder have advisors.
Panel B of Table 2 presents information on the stability of advisor reputation over time. To determine the stability of reputation over time, we rank all advisors by their reputations at the beginning of each period. We then place them into five groups with the top 10 reputation advisors put in group 1, the next 10 in group 2, and so on. We create five similar groups at the end of the period and document changes in the group classification of advisors from the beginning to the end of the period. We place advisors in group 6 if their reputation does not place them in the top 50 advisors at the end of the period. Since the patterns are similar across all the years, we report the stability analysis only for the two halves of the sample period. Panel A presents descriptive statistics regarding the reputation of the target and bidder advisors in 324 successful tender offer contests. The reputation of the target advisor (TREP) and bidder advisor (BREP) is measured as their respective market shares in the year of the transaction, and RELREP BREP/TREP. Panel B provides some statistics to assess the stability of advisor reputation over time. To determine the stability of our reputation measure over time, we rank all advisors by their reputations at the beginning of each period. We next place them into five groups with the top 10 reputation advisors being classified in group 1, the next 10 in group 2, and so on. We consider only the top 50 advisors. We sort advisors into similar five groups at the end of the period. We document changes in the group placement of advisors from the beginning to the end of the period. Advisors are placed in group 6 if their reputation does not place them in the top 50 advisors at the end of the period. Thus, over the period 1982-1988, out of the top 10 advisors in 1982 (group 1 advisors), eight advisors remain in group 1 and the remaining two advisors fall into group 2 in 1988. Similarly, over the period 1988-1994, out of the top 10 advisors in 1988 (again group 1 advisors), eight advisors remain in group 1, one advisor falls to group 2, and one advisor drops out of the top 50 altogether in 1994.
We find that advisor reputation is highly stable for the top echelon of advisors. Over the period 1982-1988, eight out of the top 10 advisors in 1982 are in group 1 in 1988 and the remaining two advisors fall into group 2. Similarly, over the period 1988-1994, eight out of the top 10 advisors in 1988 remain in group 1, one advisor falls to group 2, and one advisor (Drexel Burnham Lambert) drops out of the top 50. On a year-by-year basis, we find that seven advisors (First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lazard Freres, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Brothers) rank among the top 10 every year in the sample period. We classify these advisors as bulge bracket advisors for our study. Advisor reputation is less stable for lower groups and the stability decreases progressively. Of the 10 group 2 members in 1982 (1988), six (eight) were in groups 1, 2, or 3 in 1988 (1994) . On the other hand, of the 10 group 3 members in 1982 (1988), five (six) were in groups 2, 3, or 4 in 1988 (1994) .
We also document the specific services provided by financial advisors in our sample of takeovers where both firms employ advisors. Target advisors provide advice in over 98% of the transactions. The next most frequent function for target advisors is to provide a fairness opinion. For approximately 52% of the targets, advisors serve in an advisory role and provide a fairness opinion. All the other functions occur in fewer than 6% of the cases. Bidders most frequently offer advice (92%) and manage the deal (89%). Other functions such as deal initiation, arranging financing, providing financing, and equity participation occur in 5%, 5%, 3%, and 1% of the transactions, respectively. We also examine whether firms specialize in advising targets or bidders. Among advisors that appear at least 10 times in our sample, we find that Alex Brown, Goldman Sachs, and Kidder Peabody tend to advise targets, while Drexel Burnham Lambert and Lehman primarily advise bidders.
D. Other Variables
We use variables suggested in the extant literature as control variables in our tests for the relation between financial advisor reputation and takeover wealth gains. These variables are also used in our analyses of the determinants of the decision to retain an advisor and bid success. We describe these control variables below.
Strategic Complexity captures factors that make it more difficult for the bidder to complete the takeover and, generally, increase the time to deal completion. 11 The variable consists of the sum of five dummy variables that respectively equal one if i) the target has anti-takeover defense mechanisms, 12 ii) a family owns more than 20% of the target, iii) there is pending litigation associated with the deal, iv) the deal needs regulatory approval, and v) the state in which the target is incorporated has anti-takeover laws. Our complexity variable measures factors that provide a strategic bargaining advantage to the target. Hostile Target is a dummy variable that equals one when the target management is hostile to the bid. Offer Includes Stock is a dummy variable that equals one if the bidder's offer includes any stock. Multiple Bidders is a dummy variable that is one if there are multiple bidders, and zero otherwise.
Bidder Toehold is the ratio of the shares owned by the bidder in the target firm to the total number of target shares outstanding. Toehold ownership in the target as a determinant of the success of a takeover as well as the price at which the takeover succeeds has received considerable attention in the literature (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Stulz, Walkling, and Song (1990) , Walkling (1985) , and Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1992) ). Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership is the fraction of equity owned by corporate insiders in the target (bidder) firm. Target Size/Bidder Size is the ratio of the market value of equity of the target to the market value of the bidder, with both values being measured five days prior to the announcement of the bid.
We measure Target (Bidder) Prior Experience by the number of takeoverrelated activities undertaken by the target (bidder) in the preceding 10-year period. In addition to the expertise argument of Servaes and Zenner (1996) , prior takeover experience could represent overinvestment (Jensen (1986 (Jensen ( ), (1988 ) or managerial hubris (Roll (1986) ). Mitchell and Lehn (1990) provide evidence supporting the latter theories.
13 Following Servaes and Zenner (1996) , Related Business equals one if the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code in their respective first four SIC codes. Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that corporate diversification destroys value. Supporting this premise, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that bidder wealth increases when the target is in a related line of business. Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail (1998) report significant stock declines for bidders in conglomerate stock-for-stock mergers. Number Target (Bidder) SIC Codes measures the target's (bidder's) degree of pre-takeover diversification and is the number of four-digit SIC codes in which the target (bidder) operates. Table 3 presents the distribution of the 413 tender offer bids in 390 takeover contests by year. It also provides a breakdown of the sample by year based on: i) whether the offer is hostile, ii) whether the bid includes stock as any part of the financing, iii) the presence of multiple bidders in the contest, and iv) whether the parties operate in related industries. Table 4 presents the mean, median, minimum and maximum values of the control variables for the tender offer bids. Following Servaes and Zenner (1996) , we substitute the average value when information on a particular variable is missing. To preserve the qualitative distinction between successful and unsuccessful takeovers, the averages are computed separately for the two samples. The sample consists of 413 tender offer bids in 390 takeover contests from 1981-1994. Table 2 provides the frequency and percentage of the tender offer bids by year. A similar breakup is provided based on whether target management is hostile to the bid, the offer includes stock, whether there are multiple bidders in the contest, and whether the target and bidder operate in a related business. The target and the bidder are said to operate in a related business if they share a common three-digit SIC code.
III. Advisor Reputation and Wealth Gains in Successful Takeovers
In this section, we present findings on the relation between advisor reputation and wealth gains in 324 successful takeovers. To control for the influence of outliers, we use percentile ranked values instead of the dollar values of the wealth gains in our regressions. We compute percentile ranks by arranging the wealth gains in an ascending order with the highest wealth gain assigned the highest percentile rank. As an alternative to using percentile ranks, we also trim the sample of 324 takeovers by deleting 10% of the largest and the smallest wealth gains and The sample consists of 413 tender offer bids in 390 takeover contests from 1981-1994. Strategic Complexity includes factors that make the takeover more difficult for the bidder. Hostile Target, Offer Includes Stock, and Multiple Bidders are dummy variables that equal one when target management is hostile to the bid, the bid includes stock, and there are multiple bidders, respectively. Bidder Toehold is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership represents the fraction of own-firm shares owned by target (bidder) insiders. Target (Bidder) Size is the market value of target (bidder) equity. Target (Bidder) Prior Experience is the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target (bidder) in the ten years prior to the current deal. Related Business is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code. The No. Target (Bidder) SIC Codes is the number of four-digit SIC codes that the target (bidder) operates in.
estimate all our regressions on the resulting sample of 260 deals with the dollardenominated wealth gain as the dependent variable. To ensure that our findings are robust to using average values for BREP and TREP when firms do not employ advisors, we also conduct our tests on the sample of 246 takeovers in which both the target and the bidder have advisors.
Since several of the variables used in our tests are also determinants of the decision to retain an advisor (see Servaes and Zenner (1996) ), our results may be influenced by an endogeneity bias. We find that our results, however, remain unchanged after controlling for endogeneity. For the sake of expositional ease, we present the unconditional regression results and describe endogeneity issues and related tests at the end of the section.
A. Bidder Wealth Gains
We present the results from our analysis of the determinants of ranked bidder wealth gains in Table 5 . The coefficient on RELREP is positive and significant at the 1% level in all three samples indicating that employing an advisor with a higher relative reputation creates value for the bidder. Among the control variables, we find that Strategic Complexity is negatively related to bidder wealth gains. The coefficients on Bidder Toehold, bidder's relative size, Related Business, and number of target SIC codes are positive and significant.
Finding a positive relation between bidder wealth gain and RELREP is particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that previous researchers do not detect a value-creating justification for retaining a higher reputation advisor. We argue earlier that previous researchers do not document a significant relation between advisor reputation and bidder wealth gain because they do not consider the reputation of the bidder's advisor relative to that of the target. To explore this premise, The sample consists of 324 successful tender offers from 1981-1994. In the ranked BWLTH regressions, BWLTH values in that particular sample are ranked in ascending order and this rank is the dependent variable in the OLS regression model. In the regression where the dollar BWLTH is the dependent variable, we first trim the sample at the 10% and 90% levels based on the BWLTH. The sample of 246 deals consists of only those deals in which both the target and the bidder employed financial advisors. The independent variables are as follows. RELREP is the ratio BREP/TREP, where BREP and TREP are the respective market shares of the bidder and target advisors in the year of the transaction. Strategic Complexity includes factors that make the takeover more difficult for the bidder. Hostile Target, Offer Includes Stock, and Multiple Bidders are dummy variables that equal one when target management is hostile to the bid, the bid includes stock, and there are multiple bidders, respectively. Bidder Toehold is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership represents the fraction of own-firm shares owned by target (bidder) insiders. Target (Bidder) Size is the market value of target (bidder) equity. Target (Bidder) Prior Experience is the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target (bidder) in the 10 years prior to the current deal. Related Business is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code. The No. Target (Bidder) SIC Codes is the number of four-digit SIC codes that the target (bidder) operates in. The reported p-values reflect White's heteroskedasticity correction. *Indicates significance at 10% level.
we estimate the regression with BREP and TREP included separately instead of RELREP, and find that the coefficients on BREP and TREP are insignificant. negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on RELREP in each of the two subsamples of 260 and 246 is also significantly negative (at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively). Among the control variables, Strategic Complexity, the presence of multiple bidders, target's relative size, Target Prior Experience, target's number of SIC codes, and the pre-takeover diversification level of the bidder are positively related to the target's wealth gain. The coefficients on Bidder Toehold, Target Insider Ownership, and Bidder Insider Ownership are negative. The negative relation between RELREP and target wealth gain supports the premise that hiring an advisor with a higher relative reputation is a value-increasing decision for the target. The sample consists of 324 successful tender offers from 1981-1994. In the ranked TWLTH regressions, TWLTH values in that particular sample are ranked in ascending order and this rank is the dependent variable in the OLS regression model. In the regression where the dollar TWLTH is the dependent variable, we first trim the sample at the 10% and 90% levels based on the TWLTH. The sample of 246 deals consists of only those deals in which both the target and the bidder employed financial advisors. The independent variables are as follows. RELREP is the ratio BREP/TREP, where BREP and TREP are the respective market shares of the bidder and target advisors in the year of the transaction. Strategic Complexity includes factors that make the takeover more difficult for the bidder. Hostile Target, Offer Includes Stock, and Multiple Bidders are dummy variables that equal one when target management is hostile to the bid, the bid includes stock, and there are multiple bidders, respectively. Bidder Toehold is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership represents the fraction of own-firm shares owned by target (bidder) insiders. Target (Bidder) Size is the market value of target (bidder) equity. Target (Bidder) Prior Experience is the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target (bidder) in the 10 years prior to the current deal. Related Business is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code. The No. Target (Bidder) SIC Codes is the number of four-digit SIC codes that the target (bidder) operates in. The reported p-values reflect White's heteroskedasticity correction. *Indicates significance at 10% level.
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B. Target Wealth Gains
C. Combined Takeover Wealth Gains
We present our results on the combined wealth gains from the takeover to the target and the bidder in Table 7 . Since the dependent variable is total wealth gain, which is not affected by the distributive actions of advisors, BREP and TREP enter separately in our regressions rather than RELREP. Consistent with the better merger hypothesis, we find a significantly positive relation between the combined wealth gain and both TREP and BREP for all three samples. The coefficient on Bidder Toehold is positive but is significant only in the sample of 324 contests. We find that combined wealth gains in takeovers are significantly positively related to Related Business, relative size of the target, and the pre-acquisition level of diversification of the target (Number Target SIC Codes). We document a negative relation between combined wealth gain and Bidder Inside Ownership. The sample consists of 324 successful tender offers from 1981-1994. In the ranked CWLTH regressions, CWLTH values in that particular sample are ranked in ascending order and this rank is the dependent variable in the OLS regression model. In the regression where the dollar CWLTH is the dependent variable, we first trim the sample at the 10% and 90% levels based on the CWLTH. The sample of 246 deals consists of only those deals in which both the target and the bidder employed financial advisors. The independent variables are as follows. BREP and TREP are the respective market shares of the bidder and target advisors in the year of the transaction. Strategic Complexity includes factors that make the takeover more difficult for the bidder. Hostile Target, Offer Includes Stock, and Multiple Bidders are dummy variables that equal one when target management is hostile to the bid, the bid includes stock, and there are multiple bidders, respectively. Bidder Toehold is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership represents the fraction of own-firm shares owned by target (bidder) insiders. Target (Bidder) Size is the market value of target (bidder) equity. Target (Bidder) Prior Experience is the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target (bidder) in the 10 years prior to the current deal. Related Business is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code. The No. Target (Bidder) SIC Codes is the number of four-digit SIC codes that the target (bidder) operates in. The reported p-values reflect White's heteroskedasticity correction. *Indicates significance at 10% level. Table 8 contains the results from our analysis of the determinants of the bidder's share of the total takeover gain (BPROP). The coefficient on RELREP is significantly positive implying that the bidder's share of the combined wealth gain is higher when it employs a relatively more prestigious advisor. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document that employing a more reputable advisor brings a strategic bargaining advantage to the client firm.
D. Bidder's Share of the Combined Wealth Gains
Since the dependent variable BPROP measures the share of the takeover pie that the bidder obtains, our findings on the control variables offer some interesting insights into the strategic bargaining aspects of takeover contests. The coefficient In the ranked BPROP regressions, BPROP values in that particular sample are ranked in ascending order and this rank is the dependent variable in the OLS regression model. In the second regression, we first trim the sample at the 10% and 90% levels based on the BPROP. The sample of 246 deals consists of only those deals in which both the target and the bidder employed financial advisors. The independent variables are as follows. RELREP is the ratio BREP/TREP, where BREP and TREP are the respective market shares of the bidder and target advisors in the year of the transaction. Strategic Complexity includes factors that make the takeover more difficult for the bidder. Hostile Target, Offer Includes Stock, and Multiple Bidders are dummy variables that equal one when target management is hostile to the bid, the bid includes stock, and there are multiple bidders, respectively. Bidder Toehold is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership represents the fraction of own-firm shares owned by target (bidder) insiders. Target (Bidder) Size is the market value of target (bidder) equity. Target (Bidder) Prior Experience is the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target (bidder) in the 10 years prior to the current deal. Related Business is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code. The No. Target (Bidder) SIC Codes is the number of four-digit SIC codes that the target (bidder) operates in. The reported p-values reflect White's heteroskedasticity correction. *Indicates significance at 10% level.
on Strategic Complexity is negative and significant. Recall that total takeover wealth gain is unrelated and target (bidder) wealth gain is significantly positively (negatively) related to Strategic Complexity. Taken together, these findings suggest that when the bidder faces takeover barriers, the target enjoys a significant advantage at the cost of the bidder. By the same token, having a higher Bidder Toehold in the target is advantageous to the bidder. Finally, the variable Related Business is significantly positively related to bidder's share of the total wealth gain. Recall that Related Business is positively related to the bidder's wealth gain, unrelated to the target's wealth gain, and positively related to the combined wealth gain. Thus, our results imply that the bidder enjoys a bargaining advantage in related takeovers.
E. Discussion
Our findings indicate that there are benefits to employing prestigious financial advisors in successful takeover contests. Using a measure of relative financial advisor reputation, the ratio of the bidder advisor reputation to that of the target advisor, we show that the absolute and proportional wealth gains to the bidder and the target are higher when they employ more prestigious advisors. These results suggest that hiring a relatively more reputable advisor brings a strategic bargaining advantage to the client firm. We also document a positive relation between both bidder and target advisor reputation with the combined wealth gain from the takeover, which supports the hypothesis that higher reputation advisors identify better mergers.
A natural question that arises from our results and hypotheses is that if high reputation advisors create more value for their clients, why would any firm employ a low reputation advisor? Moreover, if the target (bidder) reacts to the bidder's (target's) actions, why would the target (bidder) ever employ an advisor with a lower reputation than that of the bidder (target)? Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , p. 58 suggest that a modified version of their model could apply to the takeover setting. We offer the following characterization of the advisor reputation formation in a takeover setting that provides plausible answers to both the equilibrium-related questions posed above. Our characterization is in the spirit of the evolutionary process for obtaining an economic equilibrium in Alchian (1950) and the generalized version of the Chemmanur and Fulghieri ((1994) , Section III) equilibrium.
Consider a scenario in which at t 0 a number of advisors exist that are indistinguishable in terms of ability. In the first round, they randomly obtain takeover deals. Since all advisors have similar abilities, all advisors undertake similar activities in each deal. Simply because of luck, some advisors participate in takeovers in which their activities result in larger absolute and/or relative wealth gains for their clients. From this first experience, these advisors learn something about the takeover business and the types (in terms of attributes) of clients that are likely to most benefit from their activities. Thus, at the end of the first round of takeovers, some advisors have (by chance) done well for their clients and have also discerned the activities that create wealth for their clients. Since the market observes wealth gains, these fortunate advisors have built some level of reputation and have also improved their ability.
In the next round of takeovers, as in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , all firms first go to these reputed advisors, who now have greater skill at creating wealth gains for their clients. These advisors, perhaps because they want to further enhance their reputations or simply cannot service all clients, accept firms that best satisfy the criteria (in terms of attributes) that they have developed from their first experience. The rejected firms, therefore, have no choice but to either go without an advisor or choose a less reputed one. In the second round, a chosen few advisors' clients do well. The fortunate advisors from the first round are more likely to represent these clients in the second round because of their active selection of clients and learning in the first round. At the end of the second round, the set of fortunate advisors is likely smaller, but those that remain in the set have higher reputation and improved ability. As the takeover rounds continue, the reputation of the select few increases and also solidifies and, after a sufficient number of rounds, a hierarchy of advisors develops.
Advisors in higher tiers have greater ability to create wealth in takeovers and select clients who are most likely to benefit from their services. Reputation concerns provide these advisors with the incentive to ensure that their clients receive the expected benefits. The firms that the higher reputation advisors reject go to advisors at the next level of reputation, and so on. In this modified version of the Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) framework, the prestigious advisors provide services to the most suitable firms. Other firms must employ advisors who are less reputed. Likewise, even when the target (bidder) reacts to the advisor choice of the bidder (target), the target (bidder) cannot necessarily employ an advisor with a reputation higher than the other party's advisor. However, in this framework, the reacting firm will still try to obtain the services of the most reputable advisor that will accept it as a client.
F. Advisor Choice and Endogeneity Issues
In this section, we investigate the determinants of both the bidder's and the target's decisions to employ advisors. Many of the factors used by Servaes and Zenner (1996) to explain a bidder's decision to retain a financial advisor are similar to the variables used in our analysis of takeover wealth gains described above. Therefore, we analyze whether this commonality of determinants results in any endogeneity biases that might affect our inferences on the relation between takeover wealth gains and financial advisor reputation.
Determinants of the Decision to Retain an Advisor
We have a sample of 413 bidders of which 325 employ advisors. Corresponding to these 413 bidders, the targets employ advisors in 385 cases. Note that when there are multiple bidders, the target characteristics are the same for each of the bids, but the bidder and bid characteristics are different. We estimate probit regression models for the bidder and target decisions to retain a financial advisor. In each regression, the dependent variable is one if the firm employs an advisor and zero otherwise. Table 9 contains the results from the estimated probit models for the target and the bidder. In the first two columns, we present our findings on the bidder's choice. We find that the bidder is more likely to employ an advisor if the target is hostile, when the target is larger, and when the bidder operates in more SIC codes, that is, the bidder is more diversified. On the other hand, the bidder is less likely to retain an advisor when it has more prior takeover experience. Servaes and Zenner ((1996) , Table 4 ) report similar findings for target hostility and the bidder's prior experience. They hypothesize a positive relation for target size (deal value) but are unable to document one in the full model.
The findings on the determinants of the target's decision to employ an advisor are reported in the last two columns of Table 9 . The target firm is more likely to have an advisor when strategic complexity is higher and when the target and the bidder are larger. The positive influence of deal complexity and bidder size on the decision to employ an advisor supports our conjecture that the advisor provides strategic advisory services to the client firm. If the target is reacting to the bidder's offer, the bidder's decision could influence whether the target employs an advisor. In results not reported in the tables, we find that if the bidder has an advi- The sample consists of 413 tender offer bids in 390 contests from 1981-1994. Strategic Complexity includes factors that make the takeover more difficult for the bidder. Hostile Target, Offer Includes Stock, and Multiple Bidders are dummy variables that equal one when target management is hostile to the bid, the bid includes stock, and there are multiple bidders, respectively. Bidder Toehold is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership represents the fraction of own-firm shares owned by target (bidder) insiders. Target (Bidder) Size is the market value of target (bidder) equity. Target (Bidder) Prior Experience is the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target (bidder) in the 10 years prior to the current deal. Related Business is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code. The No. Target (Bidder) SIC Codes is the number of four-digit SIC codes that the target (bidder) operates in. *Significant at 10% level.
sor, the target is more likely to employ one. The reputation of the bidder's advisor is, however, unrelated to the likelihood that the target will employ an advisor. 
Endogeneity Issues
To investigate the existence of any endogeneity biases, we employ the Heckman (1979) procedure using Greene's (1981) estimate of consistent standard errors. In this procedure, the decision to employ an advisor is modeled as a probit regression and the determinants of wealth gains are analyzed by an OLS regression with the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) from the probit included as an additional independent variable. We investigate the determinants of wealth effects using the above procedure for the following six scenarios: i) target wealth gain conditioned on target's decision to retain an advisor, ii) bidder wealth gain conditioned on bidder's decision to retain an advisor, iii) bidder's share of the combined wealth gain conditioned on target's decision to retain an advisor, iv) bidder's share of the combined wealth gain conditioned on bidder's decision to retain an advisor, v) combined wealth gain conditioned on target's decision to retain an advisor, and vi) combined wealth gain conditioned on bidder's decision to retain an advisor.
In each of the six cases, the coefficient on IMR from the first-stage probit is insignificant indicating that the decision to retain an advisor does not introduce a selection bias in the wealth effect regressions. Moreover, the sign and significance of the determinants of wealth effects in the second-stage OLS regressions, most importantly the effects of the reputation variables RELREP, TREP, and BREP, remain essentially the same. To illustrate that endogeneity does not affect our results, we present below the results from estimating the OLS for target wealth gains conditioned on the target retaining an advisor. Note that the magnitude, sign, and significance (p-values in parentheses) on all the variables are quite similar to those for target wealth gains reported in Table 6 .
IV. Unsuccessful Bidders in Successful Takeovers
Thus far, the focus of our analysis has been on the wealth gains to targets and successful bidders in successful takeovers. In this section, we focus on unsuccessful bidders in takeovers in which the target is subsequently acquired by a different bidder. First, we present our findings on the factors that determine whether a bidder is successful in acquiring a target. Then, we investigate a sample of successful multiple bidder contests that allows us to investigate whether reputation-building concerns ensure that higher reputation advisors are more likely to give the correct advice (complete a good deal or withdraw from a bad deal) to bidders.
A. Determinants of Bidder Success
We model the success of a bidder's quest for the target as a probit regression in which the dependent variable is one if the bidder is successful in acquiring the target. We present results from estimating two models that differ only in the way that advisor reputation enters the regression. In the first model, advisor reputations enter as two separate variables TREP and BREP whereas in the second model we use RELREP. Advisors with higher reputations, whether the target or the bidder employs them, should have better ability in identifying better mergers. Assuming that there are no perverse incentive problems with bidder management or its advisors, better mergers should be successful and bad deals should be unsuccessful. Therefore, the likelihood of success should be positively related to BREP. Rau (2000) contends that bidder advisors have strong incentives to ensure the success of the bid. Testing Rau's contention requires us to enter bidder advisor reputation separately in the regression model. The target's objective for retaining more prestigious advisors may be either to seek a better merger or to defeat the bid. 16 If the objective is a better merger, then the likelihood of success should be positively related to TREP. The latter objective, however, implies a negative relation between TREP and the likelihood of bid success. When defeating the bid is the target's sole motivation, and assuming that higher reputation advisors have better strategic ability for defeating takeover bids, the target will retain an advisor with a reputation that is superior to that of the bidder advisor and bid success will be negatively related to RELREP. Defeating the bid need not be the target's only objective, for example, the target may strategically hold out for a higher premium. Then, either the bid will succeed if the bidder offers a higher premium or it will fail, implying that the predicted relation of bid success with RELREP is ambiguous. Thus, if targets are at least partly motivated to obtain a better merger, the relation between bid success and TREP or RELREP is indeterminate.
We estimate the above-described probit models on the sample of 413 bidders of which 324 are successful and 89 are not. The results are presented in Table 10 . In both models, the significantly negative coefficients on Hostile Target, Multiple Bidders, and Target/Bidder Size indicate that the acquirer's bid is more likely to fail if the target management opposes the takeover, other bidders enter the fray, or the target is relatively larger. Strategic Complexity, which captures factors that make the takeover difficult for the bidder, does not have a significant effect on the bid's success. This result supports Comment and Schwert (1995) who argue that their evidence indicates that anti-takeover measures improve the target's bargaining position but do not prevent takeover bids from succeeding. Although the coefficients on TREP and BREP are both positive, only the BREP coefficient is significant. The positive relation between bid success and BREP supports the assertion that more prestigious advisors are associated with better mergers and Rau's (2000) conclusion that bidder advisors have strong incentives to complete a deal. The coefficient on Number Bidder SIC Codes is positive in both models (significant at conventional levels only in Model 2), indicating that diversified bidders are more likely to complete deals. The coefficient on RELREP in Model 2 is not significantly different from zero.
B. Unsuccessful Bidders in Successful Multiple Bidder Takeovers
As described previously, we have a sample of 89 unsuccessful bidders and of these 51 are unsuccessful bidders in contests in which another bidder is eventually successful. These completed acquisitions involving multiple bidders provide an interesting sample to analyze reputation building by financial advisors The sample consists of 413 tender offer bids in 390 contests from 1981-1994. The dependent variable in the probits is one when the bid is successful and zero otherwise. RELREP is the ratio BREP/TREP, where BREP and TREP are the respective market shares of the bidder and target advisors in the year of the transaction. Strategic Complexity includes factors that make the takeover more difficult for the bidder. Hostile Target, Offer Includes Stock, and Multiple Bidders are dummy variables that equal one when target management is hostile to the bid, the bid includes stock, and there are multiple bidders, respectively. Bidder Toehold is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership represents the fraction of own-firm shares owned by target (bidder) insiders. Target (Bidder) Size is the market value of target (bidder) equity. Target (Bidder) Prior Experience is the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target (bidder) in the 10 years prior to the current deal. Related Business is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code. The No. Target (Bidder) SIC Codes is the number of four-digit SIC codes that the target (bidder) operates in. *Indicates significance at 10% level.
since one bidder decides to go ahead with the takeover while the other(s) decides to withdraw. We propose that completing (withdrawing from) wealth-increasing takeovers on the part of successful bidders and withdrawing from (completing) wealth-decreasing takeovers on the part of unsuccessful bidders are good (bad) decisions. We investigate the influence of the advisor's reputation on the correctness of the complete/withdraw decision. In our tests, we use the level of reputation of the bidder advisor's (BREP) instead of RELREP because using RELREP does not allow us to distinguish the case in which the target and the bidder both employ high reputation advisors from the case in which both use low reputation advisors. Reputation-building arguments suggest that a highly reputed advisor to the bidder is more likely to give the correct advice irrespective of the reputation of the target advisor. We estimate two probit regressions on a sample of 46 bidders (23 successful and 23 unsuccessful) from 23 successful multiple bidder contests. 17 In the first specification, the dependent variable is one if the successful or unsuccessful bidder advisor helps the bidder make the correct complete/withdraw decision. A successful bidder is assumed to have made the correct go-ahead decision if its wealth gain is positive. An unsuccessful bidder, on the other hand, is assumed to have made the correct withdraw decision if the wealth gain to the successful bidder is negative. Under the assumption that bidder wealth gains would have been similar for both bidders, this characterization captures the correctness of the complete/withdraw decision. In the second specification, the dependent variable is one if the wealth gain to the bidder, successful or not, is positive. We report the results from estimating the two probit regression specifications in Table 11 . In either specification, the coefficient on the variable of interest, BREP, is positive and significant indicating that employing higher reputation advisors increases the likelihood that the bidder will make the correct complete/withdraw decision. The sample size for the 23 matched contests consists of 46 bidders, 23 successful bidders, and 23 unsuccessful bidders. The independent variables are as follows. In Model 1, the dependent variable is one if the successful bidder's abnormal wealth gain is positive and zero otherwise. For unsuccessful bidders, the dependent variable is one if the successful bidder's abnormal wealth gain is negative and zero if it is positive. In Model 2, the dependent variable is one if the bidder has a positive wealth gain and zero if not. BREP and TREP are the respective market shares of the bidder and target advisors in the year of the transaction. Strategic Complexity includes factors that make the takeover more difficult for the bidder. Hostile Target, Offer Includes Stock, and Multiple Bidders are dummy variables that equal one when target management is hostile to the bid, the bid includes stock, and there are multiple bidders, respectively. Bidder Toehold is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Target (Bidder) Insider Ownership represents the fraction of own-firm shares owned by target (bidder) insiders. Target (Bidder) Size is the market value of target (bidder) equity. Target (Bidder) Prior Experience is the number of takeover-related transactions completed by the target (bidder) in the 10 years prior to the current deal. Related Business is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and the bidder have a common three-digit SIC code. The No. Target (Bidder) SIC Codes is the number of four-digit SIC codes that the target (bidder) operates in. *Indicates significance at 10% level.
Rau (2000) infers from his results that the contingent fee structure in tender offers ensures that bidder advisors complete deals regardless of value creation for the bidders, and that bidder advisor reputation is built on the ability to complete deals. McLaughlin (1990 McLaughlin ( ), (1992 documents that the contingency features in both the bidder and target advisor contract provide incentives to the advisors to complete the deal. He argues, however, that the reputation-building concerns of the advisor would, to a large extent, nullify these perverse incentives. Our earlier results suggest that prestigious advisors find better mergers. Since one would expect that better mergers are more likely to be completed, it follows that there should be a positive relation between advisor reputation and deal completion. Our finding in this section of a positive relation between the reputation of the bidder's advisor and the probability of deal completion is consistent with our hypothesis as well as with Rau's inference. However, our finding that higher reputation bidder advisors are also more likely to provide the correct advice supports the reputationbuilding aspect noted by McLaughlin.
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this article, we investigate the role of financial advisors in a sample of 390 successful and unsuccessful corporate takeovers that occur from 1981 to 1994. Our study is the first to document the benefits of employing prestigious financial advisors in successful takeover contests. Previous researchers do not find any evidence indicating that either the bidder or the target obtained any wealth benefits from employing more prestigious financial advisors. One reason why previous studies do not document a significant role for advisor reputation may be their failure to control for the reputation of the opponent's advisor (Servaes and Zenner (1996) and Rau (2000) ). Or, it may be that the reputations of the advisors chosen by the target and the bidder are entered separately into the analysis and, because of the adversarial nature of the takeover process, the separately entered advisor reputation variables do not exhibit significant relations (Bowers and Miller (1990) ). In our study, we use a measure of relative financial advisor reputation constructed as the ratio of the bidder advisor reputation to that of the target advisor. We find that the total as well as the proportional wealth gains to the bidder or the target increase as the reputation of its advisor increases in relation to that of the advisor of its opponent in the contest. Further, we find evidence to support the notion that higher reputation advisors are associated with greater wealth creation or better mergers.
Our analysis of unsuccessful bidders offers interesting insights into the incentives motivating financial advisors in takeovers. We find that the higher the reputation of the bidder's advisor, the greater the likelihood that the takeover is successful. This positive relation is consistent with maximizing client welfare as well as with the claim in Rau (2000) that deal completion is the primary objective for advisors. This objective is the result of bidder advisor fees being contingent upon deal completion. However, we find evidence that advisors act in the interest of their clients and are not motivated just by deal completion. Specifically, in the analysis of successful and unsuccessful bidders in successful multiple bidder contests, we find that higher reputation advisors are more likely to be involved with a bidder who withdraws from (completes) a potentially unprofitable (profitable) acquisition. Thus, our findings are important steps toward understanding the prominent roles played by financial advisors in takeover contests.
